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F
O
C
U
S Unplanned Explosions at Munitions  
   Sites: Concerns and Consequences
Over the past 25 years there have been reports of more than 400 unplanned explosions at munitions 
sites in almost half the world’s countries. The UEMS rate is quickly increasing. Whereas the Small 
Arms Survey’s UEMS Database shows 70 such incidents for the 10-year period between 1987 and 
1996, more than this number was registered in the past two years alone. These events occur in large 
part because states store their munitions improperly. This article reviews the direct and indirect con-
sequences of these explosions on peace and security. It also notes steps states are taking—or should 
take—to improve practice in stockpile management.
by Eric G. Berman and Pilar Reina [ Small Arms Survey ]
The Small Arms Survey defines unplanned explosions at munitions sites as accidents resulting in the explosions of abandoned, damaged, improperly stored or prop-
erly stored stockpiles of munitions and explosives. Munitions 
sites comprise storage areas such as those temporarily main-
tained during demilitarization or explosive-ordnance dispos-
al. Processing sites, whether temporary or permanent, are also 
considered munitions sites. Ammunition-manufacturing fa-
cilities (ordnance factories) are not included in this definition, 
but accidents during ammunition-processing operations with-
in munitions sites were included where known.1
The SAS has recorded unplanned explosions in 94 coun-
tries since 1987 (see Figure 1 on page 6). Explosions have re-
portedly occurred on every continent except Antarctica and 
Australia. The UEMS Database reveals more than a twofold 
increase in the number of incidents from 1997–2006 com-
pared to the previous 10-year period. Furthermore, the aver-
age number of incidents from 2007–2011 is almost 50 percent 
greater than that of the preceding five years. An average of sev-
en incidents were recorded per year during 1987–1996. Yet in 
2011, more than seven incidents occurred every two months.
Several factors contribute to the explanation of the in-
crease. Multilateral political and legal processes at the global 
and regional levels may have compelled governments to sub-
mit more comprehensive reports on UEMS. Perhaps states 
have become more willing to acknowledge the occurrence 
of such explosions to garner financial resources and techni-
cal expertise that previously was unavailable. (Since 2000, 
for example, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency has 
funded projects to destroy surplus ordnance and improve 
physical security and stockpile management practices.)2 
Another reason may be that increased public access to infor-
mation via social media could simply make it more difficult 
to keep UEMS secret.3
In assisting countries with their PSSM needs, ammuni-
tion-storage specialists focus on technical causes for UEMS. 
Such experts note that the propellants, fuzes, primers and 
explosive components comprising ammunition become un-
stable over time. Poor storage conditions, inadequate surveil-
lance and insufficient testing can exacerbate an inherently 
hazardous situation. Although the causes for many reported 
UEMS remain unknown and official explanations may be er-
roneous or misleading, a dearth of local expertise on ammu-
nition and explosives safety is clearly a contributing factor.
The direct effects of unplanned explosions are numerous. A 
single incident can result in significant casualties. In January 
2002, one particularly deadly explosion in Lagos, Nigeria re-
portedly claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people and in-
jured 5,000 more.4 Another direct consequence of UEMS is the 
dispersion of fragmented ordnance. Unexploded ordnance can 
be propelled over long distances, thus representing immedi-
ate and long-term dangers to neighboring civilians as well as 
military personnel assigned to clean up the affected area. For 
example, in June 2011, in the Udmurtian village of Pugachevo 
in the Russian Federation, a fire expanded across 18 storage fa-
cilities, triggering a blast that was felt across a 10-kilometer ra-
dius (6.2 miles) and that spread explosive fragments over the 
surrounding 16 hectares (39.5 acres).5
A single event can also result in the displacement of thou-
sands of people. In Uzbekistan, 60,000 Kagan residents were 
displaced in 2008 after more than 150 million rounds of am-
munition exploded.6 Later that year an explosion in eastern 
Ukraine’s Karhkiv Oblast resulted in a 14,000-person evacu-
ation from the city of Lozovaya because of the ensuing fire 
and blast effects.7 In 2011, a Venezuelan army depot exploded 
in Maracay, forcing the evacuation of 10,000 people.8 Later in 
the same year, after an explosion in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
some 4,000 people fled their homes near the army base for 
shelter in a stadium.9
In addition to such widespread and long-lasting effects, 
UEMS can cause extensive damage to infrastructure. In mid-
2011, an explosion in Cyprus crippled the island’s primary 
power plant. Daily power cuts across the island ensued, ad-
versely affecting the economy and exacerbating an escalating 
political crisis.10 Accounts of unplanned explosions tend to 
focus on the value of the material destroyed and the costs of 
the subsequent clean-up, especially when an external donor is 
engaged. More attention should focus on the longer-term eco-
nomic impacts and consequences for affected communities.11
Another indirect effect of poorly managed stockpiles is the 
diversion of state-owned weapons and ammunition to unin-
tended recipients. The absence of accurate record-keeping in-
hibits accountability and facilitates corruption, e.g., security 
forces renting or selling their weapons and ammunition. Poor 
storage practices can enable such misconduct, making it dif-
ficult to keep track of inventories, as is the case when recov-
ered items—such as weapons, ammunition or explosives used 
in training or confiscated from the public—are haphazardly 
tossed onto piles or into open or loose crates.
Preventing UEMS sometimes calls for expensive strate-
gies to implement and may require external assistance. The 
international community is addressing this challenge. Some 
sites may need to be closed and have their ordnance moved 
to other locations at significant cost. New sites, incorporating 
A government depot in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Photo courtesy of Gwenn Dubourthoumieu/MAG.
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Figure 1. Unplanned explosion locations as recorded by SAS.
Graphic courtesy of CISR
See footnotes page 8.
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quantity-distance12 principles and se-
curity features, may need construction 
from scratch. These concerns are ad-
dressed by groups such as the Regional 
Approach to Stockpile Reduction 
Initiative, an ad hoc coalition of nine 
countries from Southeast Europe that 
agreed to share information on their 
surplus stockpiles and demilitarization 
capacities to achieve economies of scale 
and to generate international support.13 
Many measures, however, can be 
undertaken unilaterally and with 
modest investment. As depicted in 
the RASR PSSM Best Practice cards,14 
states can achieve positive results with-
out major infrastructure projects. They 
can do so by installing proper doors 
and locks, using adequate fences and 
barriers, posting signs to warn and in-
form, and organizing the stockpile into 
stacks and aisles free of obstruction. 
Given the high human and economic 
costs of unplanned explosions, policy-
makers should appreciate the value of 
such modest investments.
Numerous challenges remain. The 
U.N. and several regional organizations 
have developed PSSM best practice and 
technical guidelines. However, such guid-
ance does not necessarily cover all obsta-
cles encountered in practice.15 Solutions 
themselves can generate new challenges. 
For example, a number of explosions at 
demilitarization plants raise questions 
about the efficacy of existing national 
controls, oversight and coordination with 
commercial contractors.16 The upcoming 
Second Review Conference of the U.N. 
Programme of Action on Small Arms 
(August/September 2012) will provide 
the international community with an im-
portant opportunity to track progress 
and consider improvements to practices 
in the field.17 
See endnotes page 81
Figure 2. The Physical Security and Stockpile Management Best Practice Cards, produced by the Small Arms Survey for the 
Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction Initiative, provide guidance on best practice for stockpile management.
MAP FOOTNOTES:
 
ALBANIA: In 1997 more than a dozen explo-
sions at ammunition depots were reported dur-
ing social unrest in several towns throughout 
Albania.
ARMENIA: The explosion in Armenia occurred 
in a depot owned by Russia's 7th Army. 
AZERBAIJAN: One of the explosions occurred 
in Azerbaijan in 1991 (no date reported) when 
the country was probably still a republic of the 
Soviet Union.   Azerbaijan regained its indepen-
dence de facto in 25 December 1991, when 
the dissolution of the Union Soviet occurred.
CHINA: This includes 10 incidents recorded in 
Taiwan, a province of China.  
CZECH REPUBLIC: The two reported inci-
dents took place before 31 December 1992, 
when Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a sin-
gle state, but in the region that became the 
Czech Republic.
ISRAEL: The two incidents took place in the 
Palestinian Territories. 
SOUTH SUDAN: The two incidents were re-
corded in Juba (2005 and 2007) after Sudan 
signed  the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (9 January 2005) and before South 
Sudan became independent (14 July 2011) 
from Sudan.  
LUXEMBOURG: The depot where the incident 
took place has been the Belgian Army's main 
munitions store since 1993.    
 
RUSSIA: Three explosions in the Russian Fed-
eration happened while it was still the USSR. 
    
Sources:  Wilkinson (2011); Zahacewsky 2011); 
Small Arms Survey (forthcoming).   
 
Eric G. Berman is Managing Director of 
the Small Arms Survey. Previously, he 
was a Visiting Fellow at the Thomas J. 
Watson Jr. Institute for International Stud-
ies at Brown University and worked for 
the United Nations in a variety of posi-
tions in Geneva, Nairobi, New York and 
Phnom Penh. He has published widely 
on U.N. and African security issues.
Eric Berman
Managing Director
Small Arms Survey
Avenue Blanc 47
1202 Geneva / Switzerland 
Tel: +41 22 908 5777, ext. 5770
Fax: +41 22 732 2738 
Email:  
   eric.berman@smallarmssurvey.org
Website: smallarmssurvey.org
Pilar Reina is a Research Assistant at 
the Small Arms Survey with a particu-
lar interest in small-arms and light-weap-
ons proliferation and misuse, as well 
as physical security and stockpile man-
agement. She holds a master’s degree 
in public management and is complet-
ing a master’s degree in political sci-
ence. She formerly served as an officer 
cadet in the Colombian Air Force. 
Pilar Reina
Research Assistant
Small Arms Survey
Tel: +41 79 548 9974
Fax: +41 22 732 2738
Email:  
   pilar.reina@smallarmssurvey.org
3
Berman and Reina: Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2012
